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Abstract
John A. Stranahan Jr
LORAWAN DEVICE SECURITY AND ENERGY OPTIMIZATION
2019-2020
Vahid Heydari, Ph.D.
Master of Science in Computer Science

Resource-constrained devices are commonly connected to a network and become
“things” that make up the Internet of Things (IoT). Many industries are interested in costeffective, reliable, and cyber secure sensor networks due to the ever-increasing
connectivity and benefits of IoT devices. The full advantages of IoT devices are seen in a
long-range and remote context. However, current IoT platforms show many obstacles to
achieve a balance between power efficiency and cybersecurity. Battery-powered sensor
nodes can reliably send data over long distances with minimal power draw by adopting
Long-Range (LoRa) wireless radio frequency technology. With LoRa, these devices can
stay active for many years due to a low data bit rate and low power draw during device
sleep states. An improvement built on top of LoRa wireless technology, Long-Range
Wide Area Networks (LoRaWAN), introduces integrity and confidentiality yet, protocol
and implementation vulnerabilities still exist within the network, resulting in security
risks to the whole system. In this research, solutions to these vulnerabilities are proposed
and implemented on a LoRaWAN testbed environment that contains devices, gateways,
and servers. Configurations that involve the transmission of data using AES Round
Reduction, Join Scheduling, and Metadata Hiding are proposed in this work. A power
consumption analysis is performed on the implemented configurations, resulting in a
LoRaWAN system that balances cybersecurity and battery life.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Background
Wireless technologies are continually evolving and improving device
connectivity, power efficiency, design flexibility, and cost reduction [1]. The
interconnection of devices that can relay information to other devices and even trigger
software-based events is a technology that has seemingly endless opportunities. The
world’s growing dependency on devices known as “things,” which are physical devices
that are constantly connecting and exchanging information with each other, is undeniable.
These “things” are part of a subset of devices connected to the internet and make up the
Internet of Things [2].
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a connected network of devices that includes
sensors, wearable devices, smartphones, and many other types of sensors that send and
receive data from the internet. The usefulness and need for data acquisition have been
ingrained into our society, commerce, and daily lives. Figure 1 below shows that
according to Statistica, the total number of IoT connected devices will reach around 75
billion by 2025 [3]. Society has become reliant on wireless devices to improve quality of
life, and the industries are dependent on more efficient and interconnected technology to
improve overall system functions. IoT devices typically gather and send information to
remote servers, allowing the analysis of that data and improving organizational operation.
The data may trigger webhooks or automated actions in the cloud.
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Figure 1. IoT Connected Devices From 2015 to 2025 [3]

To improve these wireless connections, many unique types of hardware and
software solutions exist. Long-Range Low-Power wireless devices focus on providing
sensor information from one remote device to a remote gateway. The data is routed to a
network and application server from the gateway, where the data can be used fittingly.
These devices belong to a type of wireless telecommunications known as Low-PowerWide-Area-Networks (LPWAN). LPWAN’s are a low-power network that contains
devices that transmit data over a long distance with low data rate and low bandwidth.
This technology's core fundamentals are low power consumption, low transceiver chip
cost, and an extensive coverage area [4].
These wide-area networks are considered low-powered because the devices
involved are not powered by a mains power source but rather a battery. For the devices
to send data over a long period, the data bitrate (the number of bits over time) is reduced,
2

and therefore, the power consumption over time is reduced. Low power consumption
results in the ability to set up these devices in remote areas and trust that the overall
battery life can be as long as multiple months or even numerous years. A ten-year battery
life due to the low data rate and careful selection of parameter configurations and duty
cycling is possible [5]. Real-world results will vary and most likely will be lower than
that rate depending on frequency, microcontroller hardware, firmware, and software. An
important radio frequency modulation scheme that will focus on the experiment phase is
LoRa, or “Long-Range.”

1.2 Problem Statement
External microcontrollers are increasingly being connected to the internet, and
unfortunately, with this expanded functionality, security has been given a lower priority
than connectivity [6]. When data is transferred between multiple devices or systems, each
step requires a layer of protection. Protection includes the prevention of alteration of data
or unauthorized access by attackers who do not have permissions to access the various
resources [5]. The attack surface, or the vector in which inputs can be provided, include
the physical device itself, networking hardware, servers, and other remote network
resources.
The prevention of cyber-attacks and detection and response is critical to ensure a
system is cyber secure. To deem a system secure, the following information security
tenants must be satisfied. Confidentiality of information means that data should never be
disclosed to unauthorized parties [7]. The integrity of information is defined as data that
should never be modified by those who cannot change it. Availability of data is defined
3

as the assurance that data is accessible when the user requests it. Authentication,
particularly mutual authentication, in an IoT context is a verification of identity
commonly seen when IoT devices join a network. Nonrepudiation is the assurance that
actions such as join procedures, activation, and data transmission can be traced back to
the device doing the operation, and these actions are commonly logged by IoT servers
[7].
Since LPWAN transmits data over a public unlicensed radio frequency band, it is
essential to ensure the data's confidentiality. Confidentiality could be achieved through
encryption but comes with the drawback of increased energy consumption and a shorter
availability of the device [8]. It may not be feasible to replace the battery of sensor nodes
as they can be deployed in hard to reach or even potentially unsafe environments. It follows
with such a device’s battery life must also be prioritized.
As with physical access to any device, there is an inherent threat to this
technology's security. This flaw is due to the portability and accessibility of the devices,
which may grant the ability to retrieve the devices' credentials. Protection of the keys and
ensuring that installing these devices results in a secure system is paramount [9]. The
options to secure a device must be analyzed. Solutions must be offered to ensure a greater
level of physical security and less associated risk for provisioning devices in settings such
as city rooftops, parking garages, streets, and more.
The first purpose of this work is to examine the security posture of a subset of
LPWAN devices, called LoRaWAN devices. The distinction between these types of
devices will be made in Chapter 2 of this work. The second purpose is to evaluate the power
4

expenditure of LoRaWAN devices within a testbed environment. The testbed will be used
to find a set of optimal software changes to the LoRaWAN devices. The third purpose is
to improve the security of the LoRaWAN devices and show that the changes are valid by
analyzing the overall battery consumption, battery life, and device availability. The result
is to propose a set of changes to the LoRaWAN protocol that will help strike a balance
between cybersecurity and battery life.

1.3 Strategy and Approach
This section details background information is critical to the topics that will be
addressed in the experimental phase of this work. To become familiar with and test the
hardware, software, firmware, and protocols: a LoRaWAN testbed was created. The
testbed contains a network of portable devices, concentrators, and servers and is
described in detail. The goal of the testbed is to test improvements to a real-world
application of a LoRaWAN network.
Due to a LoRaWAN network's modularity, the testbed itself is modular and many
future improvements to the LoRaWAN protocol can be tested. This work's experiment
phase is an iterative look at the power expenditure and security posture when utilizing
various existing and newly proposed configurations. Power and current measurements
were gathered from multiple types of LoRaWAN devices from a power monitor. A
statistical analysis is performed from the data collected to discover an optimal
configuration for a LoRaWAN device that balances both security and availability. This
work will address security issues on the theoretical side as well as the experimental side.
Conclusions on what changes to LoRaWAN systems will be made. The conclusions are
5

found by analyzing real power data and the theoretical framework of the LoRaWAN
protocol.

1.4 Assumptions
A few assumptions about the environment must be considered when devising a
LoRaWAN testbed. The first assumption is that the devices used to test the protocols may
not be the most energy-efficient devices. The tradeoff here is the ease of customization
and configuration of the hardware, firmware, and software. Next, there may be a loss of
accuracy with battery calculations over more extended periods. The equations are a
guideline of how long the battery should last rather than will last. Lastly, there may be a
margin of error within real-world data points as environmental factors, and quality factors
such as the real-world reliability, availability, and maintainability of the end nodes are
difficult to predict.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
Chapter 2 outlines the LoRa and LoRaWAN specification and details the relevant
information critical to keeping this long-range, low-power technology secure. The
behavior of various settings and implementations are evaluated, and the importance to the
security vs. battery life problem is considered. The primary source of information for
sections 2.4 and 2.5 that outlines the LoRaWAN protocol is from the LoRa Alliance
LoRaWAN Specification v1.0.2 document [10].

2.1 LoRa Background
LoRa (Long Range) is a patented radio frequency modulation scheme derived
from chirp spread spectrum modulation to transmit radio signals. LoRa’s name is an
acronym for “long-range,” which accurately expresses this technology's core
functionality and purpose. The LoRa protocol, which has been acquired by the
communications company Semtech, is commonly used to send sensor data via radio
waves from an IoT device or sensor to a gateway/concentrator. This technology is
agnostic from the higher Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model layers, allowing
interoperability with existing or new network architectures. The radio module has
regulatory approval to operate in the 868 and 915 MHz industrial, scientific, and medical
(ISM) spectrum [11].
As acknowledged, long-range is an important feature, yet other essential features
include low-data transfer rate, low-power, and low-cost [11]. Semtech brand LoRa
modules are available for only a few dollars online, with complete controllers available
7

for a few times the chip price. There are estimates that the battery life of these devices is
up to 10 years, depending on the hardware involved. The typical range of LoRa devices is
up to 10km, yet it relies heavily on the surrounding environment, power mode, antenna
quality, and more. In 2019 a transmission distance of 766 km (476 miles) was reached by
a LoRa module connected to a balloon, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Map Depicting Longest Distance a LoRa Frame Was Received [19]

The required amount of data sent over time is assumed to be relatively low if
these devices are chosen. There are many use cases in which this is appropriate, be it
periodic data transmission or reactions to events. Low power consumption is achieved
with small amounts of bit data sent through short radio transmissions followed by a sleep
cycle to conserve battery life. The remaining core functionality is low-cost, which is
possible because of the inexpensive manufacturing of transceivers and the inexpensive
microprocessors required to process the sensor's data.
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2.2 LoRa Physical Layer Specifications
As seen in Figure 3 below, LP-WAN (sic) devices have a longer maximum
communication distance than Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and NFC [12]. Cellular data is best for
high baud rates and long distances than LoRa, but it is met with a higher overall cost due
to the need for a SIM card for each device, subject to internet service provider rates.
LoRa is one of the best and most cost-effective alternatives if small amounts of data over
time is warranted. If there are no Wi-Fi access points in range and years of battery life is
required, LoRa would be a desirable communication protocol. Outdoor, where local area
networks are limited, the full benefits of this technology can be seen.

Figure 3. Energy Efficiency vs. Data Rate and Coverage Range [11]

LoRa is a low-power communication protocol due to the LoRa physical layer, or
the LoRa PHY. The LoRa PHY is defined as the radio interface that creates the bits from
spread spectrum modulation. The physical layer communication performance is
9

customizable with bandwidth, coding rate, and spreading factor. As far as LoRa, there are
various bands that these devices can communicate with depending on their deployed
country. Radio frequency modules are provisioned with a specific carrier frequency by
region, and the chip and antenna are manufactured and transmit on the same band (915
MHz for North America) [13]. Table 1 below shows that the adjustable settings that
impact the performance of LoRa communications are outlined [14].

Table 1
LoRa North America Regional Specification Summary

Setting

Values

Description

Carrier
Frequency

915 MHz

Operating Frequency used by Semtech SX1276 chips.

Bandwidth

125...500kHz

Higher bandwidths increase data rates but reduce
receiver sensitivity and range.

Spreading
Factor

7-12

Higher spreading factors increase radio signal
sensitivity and larger packets.

Coding Rate

4/5 . . . 4/8

A higher coding rate increases resilience to interference
and decoding errors but results in larger packets.

Transmission
Power

+20dBm to
+30dBm

Not recommended to change, increasing power
immensely affects battery life.

Note. Information is retrieved from the LoRaWAN Specification [10].
10

2.3 LoRaWAN Network Architecture
As an improvement of LoRa, LoRaWAN was developed to add confidentiality of
data, the integrity of the frames being sent, and availability to LoRa end nodes.
LoRaWAN gateways, also known as concentrators, receive the radio transmissions from
the LoRa end nodes. LoRaWAN is a MAC protocol that defines the network architecture
and communication protocol to send data from LoRa radio frequency modules securely.
The expected battery life of LoRaWAN nodes is decreased due to the overhead of
securing the payload and the activating of devices.
There are several core components of a LoRaWAN network that make it useful. A
wide range of configurations and settings available because the network is designed as a
“Star of Stars” network topology [15]. Each component has a wide array of functionality
that can meet the consumer’s needs. As seen below in Figure 4, there are four main
components within a LoRaWAN network: end nodes, concentrators, network servers, and
application servers.

11

Figure 4. LoRaWAN Network Architecture [22]

LoRaWAN end nodes, or end devices, are microcontroller units that contain LoRa
radio frequency transceivers and sensors. The transceivers are optimized for low current
consumption and high interference resistance. These devices have an overall low cost
because the radio frequency modules use an inexpensive crystal oscillator. End nodes are
also portable, easy to provision, and available with commercial off the shelf technology.
Many open-source platforms allow the framework's customization to test the interaction
between the microcontroller and the transceiver code. Gateways collect the radio
frequency transmissions from end nodes. Before a packet is sent to the gateway, the data
field is encrypted by an AppSKey, and the Message Integrity Code (MIC) is generated by
a Network Session Key (NwkSKey) [10].
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Gateways, or concentrators, are devices that allow networking operations and, in
this case, act as LoRaWAN base stations and even sensor nodes. The gateways enable
large scale deployment of end nodes and have a wide range of flexibility and
customization options. Gateways that are not connected to the internet can act as beacons
to relay end node data to another internet-connected gateway. Gateways typically offer
multiple backhaul options such as Wi-Fi, LTE, and Ethernet as well as built-in GPS
modules to keep track of remote gateways. A gateway is managed by and sends data to a
network server located in the cloud, or if a gateway-embedded network server is in use,
directly to that local network server [10].
Network Servers provide the security and scalability of the LoRaWAN network.
Network Servers provide integrity checks of each message via the MIC. When similar
payloads are sent, the MIC changes because the frame counter is incremented in each
following message. The NwkSKey is provided to the end node and network server upon
activation. The network server uses the NwkSKey and the AES-CMAC algorithm to
compute the MIC from the frame [8][10]. If the MIC calculated matches the MIC
attached to the frame, the integrity of the payload is intact. If the message was altered,
then the MIC would change, meaning that it may not be from a known source or
modified in transit. The network server can send messages downlink to the end node and
interface uplink with the application server. Most application servers provide a network
management interface to adjust parameters and settings. Network servers also interact
with databases to store device information and allow interfacing with Application Servers
[10].
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Application Servers allow the decrypting of application payloads to store, collect,
or visualize the incoming data. Much like the network server uses a NetSKey, the
application server has an AppSKey, yet it uses AES-128 CTR mode to decrypt the data
[8]. Typically, an application server has a web-interface that allows the devices, users,
and services to be configured, and a RESTful API is exposed to gather the data [27][29].
Application servers can retrieve the state of the gateway to see if it is up, show gateway
location, and show real-time logs of live frames or events coming into the server [10].

2.4 LoRaWAN Protocol Stack
The LoRaWAN Protocol stack in Figure 5 shows the hierarchy between the MAC
and physical layer. Starting from the bottom up, the Physical Layer defines the Regional
ISM Band, which outlines the allotted frequency bands for the US, EU, AS, KR, and
other geographical regions. The LoRa Modulation Layer contains the radio and
modulation standards, with software, hardware, and radio frequency regulations. This
LoRa layer deals explicitly with the bit layer implementation of the radio frequency.
Next, the MAC layer is simply the media access control layer that the LoRaWAN
protocol adds to the system. The primary purpose of a LoRaWAN node is to transmit
Application Layer data to the medium to collect and visualize the data. In this layer,
security is essential to ensure the network operator has no access to the application data.
Each layer has specific functionality and standards to ensure that the protocol operates as
intended by Semtech.

14

Figure 5. LoRaWAN Protocol Stack [10]

In Figure 6 below, The LoRaWAN message format is displayed. The Physical
Layer of the Payload seats the Preamble, PHY Header, PHY Header CRC, PHY Payload,
and CRC. The LoRaWAN aspect of the message is nested inside of the PHY Payload
within the physical layer. Within the network layer, there is the MAC Header, MAC
Payload, and Message Integrity code. The MAC payload contains application layer data:
A Frame Header, Frame Port, and Frame Payload. The Frame Header contains
unencrypted metadata of the device, which is the Device Address, Frame Control, Frame
Counter, and Frame Options.

15

Figure 6. LoRaWAN Message Format [10]

In Tables: 2, 3, and 4 below: each component of the network and application layer
of the LoRaWAN message is detailed. The knowledge of the specific functions that each
field provides within the PHY Payload allows a better understanding of the effects they
have on the system's safety and efficiency. It is essential to understand the function of
public fields versus encrypted fields or message integrity codes to understand what
metadata can be collected. Public fields allow faster processing for the gateway and
LoRaWAN Network Server and enable the LoRaWAN Network Server to quickly
determine NwkSKey's use on the payload to check the MIC. Other public fields are
useful, yet the most identifying them are the Device Address and Frame Counter. The
LoRa PHY fields in Figure 6 are not a feature of the LoRaWAN protocol but rather the
LoRa radiofrequency physical layer.
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Table 2
LoRaWAN PHY Payload Structure

PHY Payload

Size (bytes)

Description

MAC Header

1

Distinguishes between six different MAC messages.

MAC Payload

1 to M

Contains the Application Layer Data.

Message
Integrity Code

4

Calculated over the MAC Header and MAC
Payload( Frame Header, Frame Port, and Frame
Payload).

Note. Information is retrieved from the LoRaWAN Specification [10].

Table 3
LoRaWAN MAC Payload Structure

MAC Payload

Size (bytes)

Description

Header

7 to 22

Contains device specific data.

Port

0 to 1

An application-specific, fully customizable field.

Payload

0 to N

The AppSKey encrypts the sensor data payload.

Note. Information is retrieved from the LoRaWAN Specification [10].
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Table 4
LoRaWAN Frame Header Structure

Frame Header Field

Size (bytes)

Description

4
Device Address

A 32-bit identifier for end-devices contains a
NwkAddr and NwkID.

Frame Control

1

Network control information that controls data
rate and acknowledgments of previous
messages.

Frame Counter

2

Field used for numbering the sequence of the
frame. A unique Frame Counter adds MIC
variability.

Frame Options

0 to 15

Used to change data rate, transmission power,
and check connection.

Note. Information is retrieved from the LoRaWAN Specification [10].

Within the MAC Options layer, the architecture provides three device classes of
connectivity node to gateway connectivity: Class A, Class B, and Class C. Class A stands
for “All” device functionality, Class B stands for “Beacon” communications, and class C
represents “Continuous” communications. The experiments in this work are solely on
Class A devices as they are more commonly used and are used when longer battery life is
desired. The varying device classes and their receive states are visualized in Figure 7
below.
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Figure 7. LoRaWAN Communication Classes [24]

Class A devices are optimized to minimize power expenditure and to have high
energy efficiency. Class A devices are battery-powered and bidirectional: where the
nodes can transfer data uplink to a gateway and accept downlink transmissions
momentarily. These devices are useful when sensors or actuators are used that do not
have latency constraints and cannot be hardwired or connected to an external cellular or
Wi-Fi network. Every LoRaWAN device supports this base type of communication. The
end node opens two slots of time in which the device can receive transmissions from a
gateway. If a class A device does not receive a message, the node will perform without
interruption and still send uplink messages to the gateway [11][16].
19

Class B or Beacon devices are battery-powered and bidirectional, much like Class
A devices, yet these devices also open up extra received windows at scheduled intervals.
Class B devices have two receive slots like Class A devices. In addition to the two
receive slots, Class B devices open additional receive slots at scheduled intervals to
collect downlink messages. The gateway sends a network beacon transmission to the end
node to start the beacon period. Within this beacon period, the end device opens a ping
reception slot at a given interval. When a downlink ping is received from the gateway,
the end node sends the response. It is worth noting that a Class B device has inherent
downlink latency restrictions and cannot support Class C functionality [11][16].
Class C, or Continuous, devices are mains powered bidirectional devices and
optimal for actuators and sensors. The two-way communication is maximized due to
lower latency and a more continuous listening of downlink messages/commands. There is
a large power draw because there is always an open receive window for the node if it
does not transmit data. Class C devices have the two receive slots activated after a
transmission, much like Class A devices. Still, after the second receive slot, the receive
window remains open until the next uplink message to the gateway. The majority of the
research within this document will not consider these devices because they are not battery
resource-restricted and not impacted by changes to the LoRaWAN protocol [11][16].
2.5 LoRaWAN Device Activation
LoRaWAN devices can be activated on the network by multiple procedures.
These procedures include Activation by Personalization (ABP) and Over the Air
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Activation (OTAA) [10]. Each of these activation methods has its benefits and drawbacks
regarding convenience, security, and power-efficiency.
Activation by Personalization (ABP) is the hardcoding of the Device Address
(DevAddr), NwkSKey, and AppSKey onto the end-device and Network Server [10]. As
detailed in Figure 7, ABP does not require a handshake between the node and the
network server; as soon as the node joins the network and the network server has the keys
mentioned earlier, the node can start sending data to the network. The DevAddr is a 32bit device address that is assigned to the device manually. The AppSKey is used to
encrypt the frame payload (our data) using AES-CTR within the MAC payload nested
inside the PHY Payload [11]. Once the data is encrypted, the MIC is computed over the
entire MAC frame payload. The MIC is appended to the MAC frame payload to ensure
that the packet has not been modified in transit. When using ABP, the device is locked to
specific network and application servers. Not having a schedule to update the session
keys always will save the battery life of the node over time, but this will add more
physical security risk to the system. The downside to this scheme is that the keys are not
session keys anymore. This downside means that there are preloaded keys, in which
sending new keys to the device is only possible if you have physical access to the device.
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Figure 8. LoRaWAN: Activation by Personalization [10]

Over the Air Activation (OTAA) is the most recommended method for a node to
join the network [10]. As seen in Figure 8, OTAA is safer because it allows mutual
authentication between the device and the network server. With OTAA, the session keys
are unique per device per session and are regenerated during every join. OTAA is a
procedure that relies on the preloading of a DevEUI, an AppEUI, and an AppKey. The
DevEUI is an Extended Unique Identifier that is a EUI-64-based unique identifier
attached to the node upon manufacturing. The AppEUI is a global application ID that
uniquely identifies the node and is used for the activation procedure. The AppKey, or
application key, is a 128-bit AES key that helps generate the AppSKey and NwkSKey.
AppKey privacy is important because if an attacker gets the AppKey, they could generate
the AppSKey for themselves. Once OTAA is initiated, the NwkSKey and AppSKey are
calculated from the AppEUI and AppKey to join the network successfully. When the
device is rejoined to the network, a DevAddr, NwkSKey, and AppSKey are now
provisioned. This process is unlike in ABP, where the keys remain the same for the
node's life.
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Figure 9. LoRaWAN: Over the Air Activation [10][26]
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
This chapter summarizes the technologies, theories, and strategies relevant to the
proposed solutions within this work. LoRaWAN technology is relatively new and
continually improving, and there are a few key experiments that helped create the
problem statement.

3.1 LPWAN Security Survey
In the paper “A Survey on the Security of Low-Power Wide-Area Networks:
Threats, Challenges, and Potential Solutions,” many research gaps about LPWAN
networks are detailed [9]. Recent research on key LPWAN security challenges was
introduced, such as replay attacks, denial-of-service attacks, and more. The effect of the
attacks and various approaches proposed to solve them are listed within the publication.
There are multiple types of LPWAN protocols and technologies, and they do share some
similarities with LoRaWAN networks which are mainly the focus of this work.
Side Channel attacks are a threat to LPWAN devices because the secret keys are
stored in EEPROM on the nodes. The paper highlights the use of better encryption, faster
encryption, tamper-proof cases for nodes, and authentication measures to combat this
threat. Device key management flaws or a compromised key affect the data's
confidentiality in the system [9]. A solution this publication considered is the usage of a
cryptographic co-processor for key storage. This allows each end node to store the keys
securely to prevent physical attacks that involve extracting the key from the end node.
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This requires the use of an external hardware security module or one integrated into the
node itself.

3.2 Encryption and Power Consumption
Via experimental results, it was concluded that the selection of encryption
methods used for data transmissions would affect the overall battery consumption for a
mobile device [17]. The authors of the paper entitled: “Energy-aware Security in MCommerce and the Internet of Things” found that the usage of the AES-128 increased
battery consumption by 75% and processing time by 65% compared to non-encrypted
transmissions. Compared to AES-128 to encrypt data, using AES-192 increased both
battery and time consumption by 8%. Compared to AES-128 to encrypt data, using AES256 increased both battery and time consumption by 16%. All of the tests were
completed on a Windows XP Based laptop, and results will vary between different types
of hardware and software, but generally, these figures show an expected trend. The
publication also concluded that the ability to select what level of encryption primitive or
configuration used would be beneficial to allow an “energy-aware” policy. Thus, the
future of battery and non-battery powered IoT devices requires some variance in what
protocols to use for specific devices if this technology is here to stay [17].

3.3 AES Cryptanalysis
D'souza et al. [18] address the AES algorithm's drawbacks and proposes
improvements by using a Dynamic Key Generation and Dynamic S-Box generation. One
concern surrounding AES, a symmetric encryption standard recommended by the US
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is that the security of the data
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will eventually be broken. AES attacks are still being researched because cyber-attacks
are continuously developing, and security specialists must keep proposing new systems
and schemes to keep practical attacks from being successful. The authors state that bruteforce attacks, differential attacks, algebraic attacks, and linear attacks exist. The breaking
of the symmetric algorithm means that private information can be intercepted and is no
longer confidential. The dynamic key generation utilizes the value of time at the start of
the generation and salt to create the key. The dynamic S-Box makes it more difficult for
attackers to study static sets of S-Boxes.
Alanazi et al. [30] have completed research that addresses that AES security is not
absolute and that the relationship between cost and time enforces AES's security. The
idea is to retrieve data by finding the valid key; it will cost a large amount of money and
take a large amount of time. Speculations that government intelligence services may have
the technical and economic means to attack keys equivalent to about 90 bits. An
investment budget of 1 million dollars can handle key lengths of about 70 bits. It is noted
that if the speed of computing devices doubles every year, the higher end of Moore’s
Law, a crack can be made within the next 10-20 years with a high budget. If an attacker
can try keys at a rate of one billion keys per second, the attacker will need around
10,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 years to break AES 128, the weakest of the AES
algorithms. Increasing to 50 billion keys per second would take 5 x 1021 years to check
all possible keys, which equals about five thousand billion billion years.
When deciding what key length to use, it is essential to know the length of time
the data will need to be confidential. If the data must be secured for a few hours or a few
days and the information is no longer interesting or important, the encryption scheme's
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choice does not need to be the optimal solution. On the other hand, if data must be
secured for a lifetime, an algorithm that will stand the test of time must be chosen. An
exhaustive search of AES's keyspace is impractical for many decades unless the
computational power of practical attacks increases exponentially and there are no
shortcuts found to bypass the need to default to a brute force attack [30].
Bogdanov et al. [31] have publicly published the best-known key attack on AES
called the biclique attack. The biclique approach was originally used in hash
cryptanalysis and was applied to the AES primitive with Meet-in-the-Middle attacks. The
best meet-in-the-middle attack on AES-128 is only applicable to as few as four
transformation rounds. The rounds add confusion to the data, and the transformation
round structure of AES contains the following operations: SubBytes, ShiftRows,
MixColumns, and an AddRoundKey. The best key-recovery attack on AES-128 is only
applicable to as few as seven rounds. The computation complexity of brute force AES is
related to the key size. The complexity to brute force, or simply to check every possible
key until the plaintext is found, is O(2128). The security of full AES has not been broken
because the computation complexity required to run this theoretical attack is 2126 [31]. If
the complexity was reduced from 2128 to 2127 the keyspace is reduced by a factor of two,
or simply, divided in half. This means the keyspace that will need to be searched to find
the correct key is smaller by a factor of four with the biclique key-recovery attack. When
considering reduced rounds, the best-known attack on 8 round AES-128 is the biclique
attack with a computation complexity of 2124.9 required to break it [31]. When bruteforcing full round AES-128, there are 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,
211,456 possible keys to check. When running a biclique key recovery attack on full
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round AES there are about 85,070,591,730,234,615,865,843,651,857,942,052,864
possible keys. When running a biclique attack on 8 round AES there is a about
39,686,834,346,933,596,647,877,615,529,848,297,995 possible keys. This attack means
that practical attacks on a reduced round version of AES 128 will take a longer time than
it is worth, and therefore using reduced rounds is not unsafe.

3.4 Round Reduction
J.-P. Aumasson, a presenter at Real-World Crypto 2020, concluded in his paper
“Too Much Crypto” that many cryptography primitives would not be less safe with fewer
rounds [32]. The various primitives considered to have round reduction implemented
includes AES-128, which is the only scheme used by the LoRaWAN standard. The paper
concludes that if performance matters, the number of rounds chosen in creating a
primitive should be picked after careful cryptanalysis. This fact is even more true in the
case of LoRaWAN devices because they are resource-constrained devices. Also stated is
the assumption that the paper will not cause any immediate change in the algorithms
mentioned. Yet, data scientists and risk management experts should have a say in the
conversation [32].
As far as security is concerned, increasing the number of rounds is a safe way to
ensure more security, yet this does not benefit resource-constrained devices. More detail
about the safety of reduced round AES will be prominent in Chapter 4. In a realistic
scenario, a standard attacker that does not have seemingly infinite resources is more
likely to find issues with implementation, protocols, and hardware before any attack on
AES with reduced rounds is worth it. Aumasson argues that if your device uses AES-128
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and you say that reducing rounds of AES may result in a supercomputer running a 280
attack, then the overall problem of the security of a system cannot be answered by
cryptography. You have a bigger problem on your hands [32]. When applying this logic
to LoRaWAN: if sensor data is sent over public radio waves with the LoRaWAN
standard AES-128 encryption and adversaries from intelligence organizations are a
threat, the data should probably not be collected and sent publicly with radio
transmissions at all.
Encryption works because it is unlikely that data will be decrypted in an efficient
and realistic period by realistic attackers. Reducing AES rounds to the suggested nine
rounds of encryption does not make it more likely that data will be decrypted in an
efficient and practical time. The time to brute force even 9 rounds of AES is unrealistic
inefficient. If the data is eventually decrypted, all of the required confidentiality and
integrity of the data is void. Luckily, the LoRaWAN protocol was set up such that the
cryptography involved is not just for data hiding but also for ensuring that the data is
coming from the correct source; therefore, two keys would need to be cracked to cause
the maximum amount of malice to the system.

3.5 Literature Review Summary
The idea presented in this work is to utilize current research factors and
implement various improvements that favor battery life and those that favor security and
find a balance between these two. Multiple configurations of a LoRaWAN node are
tested and the results are assessed. These configurations offer to the end-user the ability
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to choose to use a higher security policy based on their data security needs or a higher
battery efficiency policy based on their availability needs.
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Chapter 4
LoRaWAN Security Vulnerabilities and Solutions

4.1 Overview
The LoRaWAN protocol is secure in terms of data itself because the protocol
implements cryptographic mechanisms to ensure payloads remain secure throughout the
frame's life. The security implementation is future-proofed and makes LoRaWAN
devices safe to use in many industries. Though the protocols used are secure, security
vulnerabilities are exposed due to improper implementation of a LoRaWAN Network.
Another reason is the use of metadata. The threat types that can affect a LoRaWAN
network are disclosure threats, alteration threats, and denial or destruction threats. If
proper precautions are not taken, the LoRaWAN network can become exposed to
physical attacks, metadata collection, triangulation, malicious gateways, and replay
attacks.

4.2 Physical Attacks
Due to the portable and remote nature of LoRaWAN end nodes, the most
challenging security issue in IoT is resiliency against physical attacks. This type of attack
is when a malicious actor tampers with hardware components or access credentials on a
device. LoRaWAN devices are typically unattended and distributed, making them more
vulnerable to these types of attacks, especially when they are provisioned for outdoor
applications [9].
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A common threat type on LoRaWAN devices is denial or destruction threats.
These threats remove the devices from the network and affect the availability of the
system. Alteration threats such as sensor manipulation are another way to add false data
into a system that compromises the data's integrity. Next, with LoRaWAN devices, keys
can be read from the devices and utilized to create a malicious node. Simple deterrent
measures can be added to individual nodes within a LoRaWAN network and are listed
below.
First, tamper-proof containers for the nodes can add a layer of physical protection
to the hardware. If more physical security beyond that is required, movement sensors
near the nodes can be implemented. The activation of the sensors can send a message to
the network server to run logic that blocks uplink data or can set up a downlink payload
to the nodes nearby. Similarly, data streams can be analyzed on the application server,
and if the payloads received are unusual or do not fit within an input validation scheme, a
downlink message can be sent to deactivate the node on the network server-side. As a last
resort, kill switches, which disable a device when an attack is detected, can also be used
to combat physical attacks [9].
To ensure the most significant cyber-physical attack protection, protecting the
keys on the device is critical. We must protect the keys on the device that allow
confidential data to be sent to the network server using a hardware security module or
cryptographic coprocessor that can be added to a node. A hardware security module
allows secure key storage that ensures the keys cannot be extracted from the node. The
result of this is more robust authentication security to the node. The ATECC508A is a
chip that offers 10Kb EEPROM memory for key storage, certificates, and data. To
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protect the microcontroller's physical security, a cryptographic co-processor such as the
ATECC508A has several security features built-in [28].
If a malicious entity wishes to obtain secret information from the chip via
modification, manipulation or probing: the use of active shields is a countermeasure to
the attack. There is a feature called Active Shield Circuitry, which provides the chip with
self-detect physical attacks and helps protect the memory on the device. The integrated
circuit has metal lines covering it, and there are predefined random data ran across the
lines. From then, a receiver observes the data [33]. The physical attacks will disturb the
integrity of the shielding lines that contain random test data as the receiver will not get
the correct data because the lines will short circuit or open [33].
The ATECC508A chip also has internal memory encryption to protect the
EEPROM memory that contains keys, certificates, and data from being read [28]. The
chip additionally offers Glitch Protection by use of filters when active or sleep. The
alternating current pulses are monitored to ensure the device ignores any shorter or longer
pulses than the filter values [28]. The supply voltage and logic clock are generated in the
chip, which prevents any voltage tampering on the device's pins. Included is a NIST
CAVP certified Random Number Generator with a dynamic internal seed stored in the
EEPROM [28].

4.3 Malicious Gateways
Malicious gateways are another potential threat to the security of a LoRaWAN
network. Malicious gateways capture the data sent on the radio frequency or could go as
far as to spoof existing trusted gateways. Through malicious gateways, attackers can filter
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out packets that are upstream to the network server or downstream to a gateway and
falsely confirm uplink messages so that they never make it to the network server.
Utilizing confirmed uplink and downlink messages can help combat this attack [9][11].
In terms of LoRaWAN node technology, confirmed uplink messages mean our
LoRaWAN device requires the network to confirm that the message was received by
sending confirmed downlink messages. Confirmed downlink messages are simply the
opposite, meaning the LoRaWAN network sends a confirmation frame to the node that
received the message. The implementation of any of these will keep the radio frequency
transmitter powered on longer and increase the overhead and thus the battery power draw
over time. In this case, Class C devices that are hooked up to the main power line will
benefit the most from this configuration. Class B devices implement confirmed downlink
messages and, as a result, are less efficient compared to Class A devices.
Suppose the node requires downlink messages from the gateway, and there is a
concern with malicious gateways sending false downlink messages. In that case, the
solution is to remove the need for downlink messages entirely on standard data
transmissions. This will not affect the OTAA scheme as there is a separate MAC
command for that. An issue with removing downlink messages to the node is that some
data may be lost if it is not requested to be resent.

4.4 Untrusted Network Servers
To ensure that the application can trust the network server, the same
organization must create the network server. The network server and the application
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server are designed to be end-to-end encrypted, but this is possible to override in reality.
A malicious untrusted network server can derive the AppSKey during the OTAA stage.
If an untrusted network server does this operation, the end-to-end encryption is
broken. Therefore, only trusted network servers should be used if a LoRaWAN network
is required because application data is now exposed to the network server. This does limit
the scalability of the LoRaWAN node because the usage of a third-party network server
limits the number of available options.

4.5 Metadata Collection
Because LoRaWAN technology uses a public frequency, public metadata fields
exist, as seen in Chapter 2.4, Figure 6. Public fields in the metadata are cleartext that is
visible to all gateways that capture the radio frequency. Anyone can set up a gateway and
collect the activity of end nodes. An attacker can access this and make assumptions about
what may be in the payload, even though they cannot decrypt the data field within the
payload. Though this is not a direct attack on confidentiality, this information may be
helpful in certain situations during the reconnaissance phase. Metadata collection is
difficult to solve because the metadata is used by gateways to determine if the packet
should be processed. However, metadata collection can be combated with a few
measures.
One method of reducing metadata collection is to utilize a highly directional radio
frequency transmitter, which targets the direction of the frequency [38]. By default, LoRa
devices use an omnidirectional transmitter. Targeting the frequency in a specific direction
ensures that a limited number of gateways will pick up the signal. Another method to
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combat metadata collection is to pad all payloads to be a set size to not reveal any hints at
what is being sent by the packet based on external data observed. Padding the packets
does add overhead to the LoRaWAN transmissions due to the processing involved. The
extra bytes added to pad the payload will need to be processed by the encryption
algorithm, resulting in a longer processing time and higher energy expenditure.
The simplest way to protect against device and frame counter metadata collection
is to upload code onto the node that allows OTAA on a schedule [39]. This work will
reference this scheme of OTAA on a schedule as Join Scheduling. OTAA not only
requests a new NetID, DevAddr, and AppNonce, but it also resets public fields such as
the frame counter and public dev address. The AppNonce allows the generation of the
new NwkSKey and AppSKey. OTAA rejoins the node to the network, and the device
address and the frame counter are no longer the same. If metadata is being collected and
the device address and frame counter always change while using Join Scheduling, there
are fewer frames with public data that can be mapped to a single node.
A more advanced method to reduce the impact metadata collection has than Join
Scheduling is a change to the protocol to ensure that the device address and frame
counter are not public. The original LoRaWAN standard PHY payload creation method
makes device addresses and frame counters public and allows data to be tracked during
the reconnaissance stage of an attack. A proposed Metadata Hiding scheme will ensure
that the packet's sequence number or frame count cannot be tracked, as well as the device
address.
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The encryption scheme must be understood and mapped to analyze improvements
to the encoding process of the PHY payload on an end node. The following steps
required for payload encoding are listed below, and they are illustrated in Figure 10. The
information is based on the LoRaWAN specifications for MAC message formats [10].
Figures 10 to 15 include ciphertext, cleartext, and plaintext. The ciphertext is defined as
encrypted data, cleartext is information that is not intended to be encrypted or
transformed even when privacy is being used, and plaintext is information that is
intended to be encrypted [28].
Step 1: The Frame Port is set to 0x1. If the Frame Port is not set to zero, the
protocol dictates that the Frame Payload is encrypted by the AppSKey.
Step 2: The Data field is the data that is measured by a sensor, and it is then
encrypted using the AES-128 algorithm with the AppSKey as the key. Every
cleartext field is populated before Step 3.
Step 3: Once the PHY payload is created, the MIC is computed using AESCMAC, and it is attached to the PHY payload. The end node contains both the
keys, and the network server has the NwkSKey, and the application server has the
AppSKey to ensure the end-to-end encryption.
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Figure 10. LoRaWAN Standard End Node PHY Payload Encoding

Concerning the goal of finding improvements to the PHY payload's decoding
process within the network server, the decryption scheme must be understood and
mapped. The following steps required for payload decoding in Figure 11 below are as
follows:
Step 1: The Frame Port is set to 0x1, which dictates that the AppSKey was used
to encrypt the frame payload.
Step 2: The PHY payload is sent through the AES-CMAC algorithm with the
NwkSKey, and a MIC is generated.
Step 3: The network server verifies that the calculated MIC matches the MIC of
the PHY payload. If they are both the same, then the data was not modified
during transfer, and the device address and device counter were not changed.
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Step 4: The packet has now been cleared to be sent to the Application Server,
which has the AppSKey required to decrypt the payload. This step helps ensure
that the network server does not have access to the encrypted frame payload, thus
satisfying end-to-end encryption.

Figure 11. LoRaWAN Standard PHY Payload Decoding

In Figure 12 below, a proposed method of hiding the device address and frame
counter is outlined to favor end-to-end encryption. A random device address and frame
counter are also generated to add variability. The following steps required for improved
node frame encoding with an untrusted network server are as follows:
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Step 1: The first step is to set the Frame Port to 0x2. The value 0x2 is chosen to
differentiate that the network server shall not use the standard PHY payload
decoding scheme.
Step 2: A random Device Address and Frame Count is generated and placed
within their prospective fields. Each of these values is generated with a random
seed to allow a pseudo-random sequence of pseudo-random numbers. This seed is
to be shared with the Network Server during the activation phase.
Step 3: The sensor data is encrypted with the AppSKey and placed into the
unencrypted Frame Payload that contains the real Device Address and Frame
Counter. The Encrypted Data field's size is equal to the size of the plaintext data
field as the AES-128 CTR mode of operation is used.
Step 4: This step involves the encrypting of the frame Payload that contains
encrypted sensor data with the NetSKey and device address, frame counter, and
sensor data with the AppSKey and placing it into the PHY Payload.
Step 5: The final step involves computing the MIC using the AES-CMAC
algorithm and the NwkSKey and attaching it to the frame. The packet can now be
transmitted over the air safely.
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Figure 12. LoRaWAN Improved Node Frame Encoding with Untrusted Network
Server

Within Figure 13, the proposed changes to the PHY Payload decoding scheme are
made for an untrusted network server. There is overhead involved with this decoding
method because the device address and frame count need to be decrypted before the
packet can be considered a packet from an authenticated node. This action means that
every packet that it captures will need to be checked. The overhead is negligible if the
gateway is connected to a wall power supply. The steps required are as follows:
Step 1: The Frame Port field must be verified to contain the value 0x2 to continue
to Step 2. If the value is not 0x3 (reserved) or 0x2, then the cleartext device
address and frame count should be considered accurate, and the standard decoding
method should be running.
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Step 2: The proper NwkSKey for the payload can be found by matching the
spoofed device address with the PRNG result after the seed is supplied. The result
is precomputed before the incoming packet arrives. This allows a quick mapping
from the spoofed device address attached to the packet to the NwkSKey and the
real DevAddr. This step also involves using the NwkSKey and the AES-128 CTR
algorithm to decrypt the Frame Payload data. The resulting data is the plaintext
Device Address and Frame Counter and the encrypted sensor Data field that can
only be unencrypted by the AppSKey.
Step 3: If the Frame Counter extracted from the decrypted frame payload is the
expected value, the packet has not been replayed. If the value Frame Counter is
not the expected value, the packet is thrown out.
Step 4: The PHY payload, except for the MIC, is sent through the AES-CMAC
algorithm with the NwkSKey, then a MIC is generated.
Step 5: The generated MIC is compared to the MIC of the frame, and if they
match, the data and device address were not modified.
Step 6: The Data field is encrypted by the AppSKey and placed into the Frame
Payload field.
Step 7: The real Device Address and real Frame Counter are added to the packet
and the spoofed versions are thrown out. This action ensures the Application
Server knows what device the data is coming from and the correct order.
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Step 8: Indicates a frame with the correct Device Address, Frame Counter, and
Encrypted Data and can be decrypted on the Application Server by the AppSKey.
The Network Server does not need to map which device address matches with an
AppSKey, and end-to-end encryption is maintained.

Figure 13. LoRaWAN Improved Network Server PHY Payload Decoding with
Untrusted Network Server

In Figure 14 below, a proposed method of hiding the device address and frame
counter is illustrated for a trusted network server. The following steps required for
encoding a frame that will be sent to a trusted network server is as follows:
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Step 1: The Frame Port is set to 0x3. The Frame Port can be set to any number
between 1 to 255; this is to dictate that a packet with data is being sent. The value
0x3 is chosen to differentiate that the network server will not use the standard
PHY payload decoding or the improved frame decoding for untrusted network
servers. This allows the original method to be used to encode and decode data as
well as additional procedures.
Step 2: The cleartext Device Address and Frame Count are replaced with random
addresses and counts to add confusion to the device's true identity. Each of these
values is generated with a random seed to allow a pseudo-random sequence of
pseudo-random numbers. This seed is to be shared with the Network Server
during the activation phase.
Step 3: Involves encrypting the real device address, frame counter, and sensor
data with the AppSKey and placing it into the PHY Payload.
Step 4: Involves computing the MIC using the AES-CMAC algorithm and the
NwkSKey and attaching it to the frame.
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Figure 14. LoRaWAN Improved Node Frame Encoding with Trusted Network
Server

In Figure 15 below, the proposed changes to the PHY Payload decoding scheme
are made for a Trusted Network Server. Like the untrusted decoding scheme, there is
overhead. Every LoRaWAN transmission that is received must have the decryption
algorithm ran to extract the correct device address and frame count. The following steps
required for decoding a frame that will be sent to a trusted network server is as follows:
Step 1: The Frame Port field must be verified to contain the value 0x3. If the field
is 0x3, then the following steps should be taken. Otherwise, the original decoding
scheme should be completed if the value is not 0x3 or 0x2.
Step 2: The proper AppSKey and NwkSKey for the payload can be found by
matching the spoofed device address with the PRNG result after the seed is
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supplied. The result is precomputed before the incoming packet arrives. This
action allows a quick mapping from the spoofed device address attached to the
packet to the AppSKey and the real DevAddr. This step also involves the
AppSKey and the AES-128 algorithm to decrypt the data from the Frame
Payload. Typically, the network server should not have access to the AppSKey to
ensure that end to end encryption is enforced. If the application server trusts the
network server and this is not required, the network server can save the NwkSKey
with the node's device address. This step involves the AppSKey and the Frame
Payload's decryption and unveils the proper Device Address, the Frame Counter,
and sensor data.
Step 3: If the Frame Counter extracted from the decrypted frame payload is the
expected value, the packet has not been replayed. If the value Frame Counter is
not the expected value, the packet is thrown out.
Step 4: The PHY payload, except for the MIC, is sent through the AES-CMAC
algorithm with the NwkSKey and a MIC is generated.
Step 5: The generated MIC is compared to the MIC of the frame, and if they
match, the data and device address were not modified.
Step 6: The plaintext Data field is encrypted by the AppSKey and placed into the
Frame Payload field. This action ensures that the Frame Payload is encrypted
when it is sent to the application server.
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Step 7: The real Device Address and Frame Counter are placed inside the Frame
Header in their respective positions. This ensures the Application Server will
know what device the payload comes from and the sequence it arrives.
Step 8: This indicates a frame with the correct Device Address, Frame Counter,
and Encrypted Data and can be sent to and be decrypted by the Application Server
with the AppSKey.

Figure 15. LoRaWAN Improved PHY Payload Decoding with Trusted Network
Server

The encoding schemes that utilize the metadata hiding in the frame payload add
time and computational overhead to the encryption method. The maximum Frame
Payload size depends on the Spreading Factor required for transmission [10]. For a
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Spreading Factor of 10-12, 51 bytes is the maximum frame payload size. For a Spreading
factor of 9, the maximum frame payload size is 115 bytes. For a Spreading Factor of 7-8,
the maximum frame payload size is 222 bytes.
The total size added to the payload with the device address and frame counter is 6
bytes. The size of the plaintext data that goes through the AES encryption is the same as
the ciphertext output size due to AES-128 CTR mode [8]. With the extra 6 bytes added to
the Frame Payload, the maximum application data size changes. For a Spreading Factor
of 10-12, 41 bytes is the maximum frame payload size. For a Spreading factor of 9, the
maximum frame payload size is 105 bytes. For a Spreading Factor of 7-8, the maximum
frame payload size is 212 bytes.
4.6 Replay Attacks
Replay Attacks are the capturing, storing, and sending of messages that were
originally sent to a gateway [9]. These messages can be publicly captured from a
malicious gateway and then re-sent to a malicious node later. Replay attacks allow the
attacker node to replay action from the past and send it to the server. A common mistake
when implementing the LoRaWAN network is to set it up without packet filtering. One
way to combat replay attacks is to ensure that the network server can keep track of the
packet counter and filter out the repeated message. The MIC provides a level of replay
protection because the device address and frame counter will need to be correct to
calculate the correct MIC [11].
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Chapter 5
LoRaWAN Testbed Design

5.1 Overview
Conductive to evaluating the cybersecurity posture and power expenditure of a
LoRaWAN sensor network, the physical hardware and software that is commonly used in
a real-world sensor network must be obtained and configured. It was a critical
requirement to develop a platform for rigorous testing of the LoRaWAN protocol that
allows complete customization and reliable measurements. A testbed implementation of a
standard LoRaWAN network, as illustrated in Figure 16 below, was created. Multiple
hardware and software configurations were configured to add variability in the
experimental phase of this work. The testbed's core elements include the network server
stack, gateway, end nodes, and power monitor.

Figure 16. LoRaWAN Testbed Architecture
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5.2 LoRa Gateway and LoRa Node
To get a better understanding of a base LoRa system's features, a LoRa gateway
was set up to receive base LoRa data. The open-source gateway that was chosen was the
Dragino LG01 [34]. With the gateway, a built-in web server is available to view,
customize, and set up a means of data transfer to external platforms such as The Things
Network (TTN) [35]. The web server GUI can be accessed via a Wi-Fi Hotspot or LAN.
The maximum range for signal transmission to the gateway has a maximum range of
about three to six miles.
For the sake of analyzing LoRa PHY transmissions without any of the benefits of
LoRaWAN, the Dragino Arduino Shield featuring LoRa technology is used. The 915
MHZ band is preprogrammed into the radio frequency transmitter for the US region’s
communications. The Dragino shield utilizes an Arduino Uno form factor and is
controlled by a sketch loaded onto the Arduino Uno. Also required is the RadioHead
Arduino library, which allows access to the Arduino radio hardware and supports the
Semtech SX1276 within the shield. Figure 17 shows the form factor of the Dragino LoRa
Shield.
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Figure 17. Dragino Shield with Microcontroller Board

5.3 Network Server Stack Architecture
Due to the star topology implementation between nodes and gateways,
LoRaWAN nodes may be selected from many different manufacturers. Many different
types of capture data and ways to utilize the radio transmitter hardware. LoRaWAN
nodes are available in open source and commercial ready packages that allow fast
development and easy integration into an existing LoRaWAN network. As long as the
LoRaWAN node supports the same LoRaWAN standard and can set NwkSKeys and
AppSKeys, the gateways can gather the activation by personalization context. Most of the
existing stacks have the option of ABP, yet OTAA is suggested for real-world
implementations due to dynamic session keys' security benefit.
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The open-source network stack that is selected for analysis is the ChirpStack
LoRaWAN stack. This stack was chosen because of the compatibility and extensive
documentation while interfacing with various models of LoRaWAN modules. This opensource software also contains all of the software needed to gather data from the
transmitter, send it to the network server, and route it to an application server. The
ChirpStack LoRaWAN server's architecture contains many components that have a
separation of concerns, collectively allowing data to be captured, forwarded, validated,
saved, accessed, and more. Figure 18 details the full ChirpStack server stack, including
Gateway components, servers, and external integrations.

Figure 18. ChirpStack Architecture [20]

The components within the Cloud/server/VM section of the stack include the
ChirpStack Gateway Bridge, ChirpStack Network Server, and the ChirpStack
Application server. The specific software, hardware, and configuration settings for the
End Nodes that send data and the gateway itself will be detailed. They offer an extended
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level of complexity and a much larger scale of customization. Moreover, it is worth
noting that the “Cloud/server/vm” components can all be hosted remotely or within the
gateway itself, and in the case of this testbed, it is all located on the gateway itself.
The ChirpStack Application Server is responsible for the management and
inventory of devices and handling join requests and the encryption and decryption of
application payloads. The web interface allows access to the network server functionality
and a way to create organizations, users, applications, and devices. Additionally, a REST
API enables endpoints to manage the LoRaWAN network when it comes to integrations,
devices, and more. Due to the device data being encrypted with the AppSKey and the
NwkSKey, device data can be decrypted, and the data can be viewed for testing purposes.
Figure 19 below shows the format of the Application Server and the various ways to
visualize application data.

Figure 19. ChirpStack Application Server
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The ChirpStack Network Server is responsible for all authentication,
encryption/decryption, the LoRaWAN mac-layer, application server communication, and
the scheduling of downlink frames. The network server makes device activation possible
in an ABP or OTAA context. One advanced setting is called ADR (adaptive data rate)
that lets the server control the device's transmission power and data rate. A control panel
that allows the setup of devices and configuration of the network is hosted by the server
and accessed at port 8080. Other features include the ability to create device profiles, set
up battery status requests, synchronize time with the end nodes, manage the entire
gateway, and even send firmware updates to gateways or nodes.
The Pub/Sub broker utilizes the MQTT( Message Queuing Telemetry Transport)
protocol, a lightweight, standard publish-subscribe network protocol that enables the
bidirectional message transport between devices [36]. The broker is the Eclipse
Mosquitto MQTT broker, which is open-source, efficient, and scalable from lightweight
devices to full-size servers. The specific purpose of this integration is to ensure that the
data that it receives is published as JSON (JavaScript Object Notation), a standard data
exchange format and file format [37]. The broker's data may be sent uplink to the
network server or downlink to the ChirpStack Gateway Bridge. The ChirpStack Network
Server Must subscribe to the application and device id to gather data from the broker.
Figure 20 below shows the packets being accepted by a network server and application
server.
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Figure 20. Network Server Payload
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Figure 21. Application Server Payload

56

5.4 LoRaWAN Gateway
The open-source, commercial gateway chosen to receive the LoRaWAN node
radio signal in this work is the RAK2245 RPi HAT Edition WisLink LPWAN
Concentrator. This concentrator is compatible with a Raspberry Pi Form factor and is
compatible with Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ or Micro Computers for DIY setup of a
commercial LoRaWAN Network. The gateway supports 903-927.5Mhz radio frequencies
for the LoRaWAN standard and supports eight channels that allow different uplink
frequencies to be processed by the radio transmitter. While this is a concentrator, the
radio module can also send downlink LoRaWAN messages with two Semtech SX125X
front end radio chips. The RAK2245 Pi Hat board arrives with an IPEX Antenna and
GPS Active antenna to track the gateway's location. The hardware required to set up the
gateway is detailed in Table 5.

Table 5
LoRaWAN Gateway Components
Hardware Type

Description

Single Board Computer

Raspberry Pi 3B+

LPWAN Concentrator

RAK2245 Pi HAT

Memory Card

16GB SD Card

Power Supply

5V Power Supply
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For the sake of simplicity, the Network Server and Application Server are both
hosted on the Gateway. The packet forwarder processes the LoRaWAN data received by
the Semtech LoRa Radio Module on the RAK2245. The packet forwarder used is the
ChirpStack Concentratord [sic], a concentrator daemon decoupled from the gateway
hardware, allowing the ability to run multiple packet-forwarding applications
simultaneously. The ChirpStack Gateway Bridge connects the packet forwarder to the
ChirpStack Network server. The bridge converts the hardware abstraction layer protocol
that the packet forwarder uses to a network server readable JSON format. The data is
transmitted from the packet forwarder to the gateway bridge via UDP by default but can
be modified to MQTT to ensure no packet loss.
Each of these components is required to be running to accept data from end
nodes. The RAK2245 is a Pi HAT (Hardware Attached on Top) that plugs directly
without the need to solder into the Raspberry Pi that hosts the operating system. The
gateway can act as a node to transmit data from the gateway's location as well without the
need to transfer to another gateway. The RAK2245 also includes a GPS module, as seen
in Figure 21 below.
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Figure 22. LoRaWAN Gateway

5.5 LoRaWAN Evaluation Board
The RAK4600 Evaluation Board is a LoRaWAN development board made up of
the RAK4600 LPWAN module and a RAK5005 Base. The LPWAN module allows the
usage of LoRaWAN on the 915 MHz band. The WisBlock Base offers an overall ultralow power consumption and UART/GPIO interface for sensors. This RAK4600 EVB
also has Bluetooth capabilities to update the firmware or send commands to the device
during the provisioning process. The manufacturer's power consumption rating is 2.0 µA
in sleep mode, which is extremely low and allows a long battery life. The supply voltage
is required to be 2.0 to 3.6V.
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Figure 23. RAK4600 Evaluation Board [21]

5.6 LoRaWAN Node with Stock Firmware
The WisDuino Evaluation Board (RAK811) is a development board that can
optionally be attached to the GPIO pins of a microcontroller to control the radio
frequency module on the HAT. The logic that controls the join, transfer, and receive
functionality is all by calling AT commands provided by the shield's firmware. The name
AT is an abbreviation for Attention, and these commands were initially designed in the
early 80s for controlling modems. The firmware of this device uses these commands, and
they are still in use in most modern smartphones to support telephony functions. Below is
an image of this configuration.
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Figure 24. RAK811 Shield

In this configuration, the RAK811 utilizes the onboard factory firmware to
directly carry out AT commands from the RAK Serial Port Tool. Through the serial port
tool, various settings can be extracted from the RAK811, such as the firmware version,
device status, LoRa radio status, etc. Through this tool, the setup of a device can be
completed without the need to upload code. The device can be set to restart, sleep, or
send mode. For OTAA, the AppKey, DevAddr, APP EUI, and Dev EUI can be set up.
The configuration for this node looks just like the previous configuration.

5.7 LoRaWAN Shield with Microcontroller Board
The RAK811 Shield with Microcontroller Board is a LoRaWAN Node that is
attached to a SparkFun RedBoard Qwiic. The RedBoard has less idle current draw than
an Arduino Uno and has a very similar form factor. The main benefit of using a
RedBoard is adding external devices quickly via a Qwiic connector. The code on the
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Microcontroller controls the firmware on the RAK811 by calling AT commands. The
Node is shown below in Figure 24.

Figure 25. RAK811 Shield with Microcontroller Board

5.8 LoRaWAN Node with Arduino Sketch
The RAK811 can have an Arduino Sketch loaded onto it without the need for a
base microcontroller. This configuration can handle the measurement of the sensor data
through the GPIO pins. The logic that controls when to utilize the radio hardware is
controlled by the sketch on board the microcontroller and the LMIC, HAL, and SPI
Libraries. The configuration for this node looks just like the previous configuration
without the microcontroller.
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5.9 Power Monitoring
The equipment used to monitor the current, power, and voltage is the Monsoon
Power Monitor (MPM). The measurements are measured through the main channel
through the alligator clips. The alligator clips are attached to the output power and ground
pins to capture the power data over time. The voltage that powers the microcontroller can
be set anywhere from 3.35V to 4.5V. The fine current scale accuracy is +/- 1% or +/- 50
µA (whichever is greater). The fine current scale resolution is 1µA, which is suitable for
the monitoring of LoRaWAN nodes. The MPM is pictured below in Figure 25.

Figure 26. Monsoon Power Monitor Hardware

The software used to interface with the Monsoon Power Monitor (MPM) is the
PowerTool software. The PowerTool software is used to analyze the performance of
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devices by monitoring the power data statistics. The graph shows the instantaneous
metrics over time and can be zoomed in or out. Specific time frames can be selected, and
the power data for that period can be displayed. Specific time frames can be chosen to
power on and off the power monitor in a particular time frame. The samples captured
over time can be saved in a capture file as well as a CSV file. Figure 26 displays a
capture of the current overtime for a device.

Figure 27. Monsoon Power Monitoring PowerTool Software
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Figure 27 below looks at a real LoRaWAN transmission captured by the software
as a CSV file, converted into a graph to visualize the instantaneous current over time. The
Class A device modes are all shown, and the sleep mode can be set to a required interval.
The Active Mode Duration includes all the activity when the node wakes up until it goes
back to sleep.

Figure 28. Class A Device Power Monitor Data Graph
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Chapter 6
Experiments and Results

6.1 Procedure
To determine the impact of reduced rounds, join scheduling, and hidden public
fields on the power draw of a LoRaWAN node, certain power data variables must be
measured and analyzed. The various configurations of devices described in the previous
chapter are measured to determine trends and find a viable solution to some of the
detrimental side effects of the LoRaWAN networking protocol. This data gathering helps
decide on optimal LoRaWAN network settings and configurations while still keeping the
transferred data secure. The conclusions made will allow improved operating costs for
industries using this technology. Additionally, they will also ensure that a LoRaWAN
network's set-up is done with power efficiency and security in mind.
6.2 LoRaWAN Evaluation Board
The LoRaWAN Evaluation Board requires the lowest voltage to run and does not
consume as much energy as a LoRaWAN module with an Arduino Uno form factor. The
purpose of testing this board is to determine the best possible battery life for the LoRa
chip used in all of the experiments. The data in Table 6 below is the average of 30
measurements and provides a benchmark for the best possible battery life over time.
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Table 6
LoRaWAN Evaluation Board Power Data
Power Metric

Idle Performance

Average Voltage

3.35 V

Average Power

0.96 mW

Average Current

0.29 mA

Battery Capacity

3500 mAh

Expected Battery Life

12,151.50 hours (16.64 months)

6.3 LoRaWAN Node with Stock Firmware
The LoRaWAN Shield with Stock Firmware was selected to test the firmware
preloaded onto the hardware on arrival. There is no way to customize the firmware to test
the round reduction or metadata hiding scheme's power data. However, OTAA is possible
to measure. The data in Table 7 below shows the Power Data during the wakeup and
transfer mode. The data in Table 8 below shows both the data for a full transmission and
a full OTAA.
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Table 7
LoRaWAN Node with Stock Firmware Transfer Power Data
Power Metric

Idle Performance

Average Time

62.864 ms

Average Current

100.211 mA

Average Consumed Energy

1.717 µAh

Table 8
LoRaWAN Node Average Power Data
Power Metric

Result

Average Tx Time

2.133 s

Average Tx Current

14.507 mA

Average Tx Consumed Energy

8.589 µAh

Average OTAA Time

5.149 s

Average OTAA Current

12.545 mA

Average OTAA Consumed Energy

17.909 µAh
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6.4 LoRaWAN Shield with Microcontroller Board
The LoRaWAN Shield with Microcontroller Board was selected to test external
control of the firmware via a microcontroller. There is no way to customize the firmware
to test the power data for the round reduction or metadata hiding scheme, yet OTAA
measuring is possible. The benefit to this configuration is the ability to easily add
additional logic to the node, such as using an external cryptographic coprocessor or
sending data at specific intervals. The data in Table 9 below is the average of 30
measurements and has the most considerable overhead due to the microcontroller needing
power.

Table 9
LoRaWAN Shield with Microcontroller Transfer Power Data
Power Metric

Idle Performance

Average Time

69.511 ms

Average Current

104.363 mA

Consumed Energy

1.991 µAh
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Table 10
LoRaWAN Shield with Microcontroller Average Power Data
Power Metric

Idle Performance

Average Tx Time

2.141 s

Average Tx Current

14.987 mA

Average Tx Consumed Energy

8.908 µAh

Average OTAA Time

5.131 s

Average OTAA Current

18.430 mA

Average OTAA Consumed Energy

17.90 µAh

6.5 LoRaWAN Node with Arduino Sketch
The LoRaWAN Node with Sketch was selected to modify the LMIC code
responsible for the AES encryption of the data. The number of rounds can be decreased,
and the power data measurements such as time, average current, and consumed energy
are below in Figures 28, 29, and 30. Each measurement was completed 30 times to ensure
accuracy. The average was calculated to ensure the results are less atypical. Table 11
below shows the power data metrics for the LoRaWAN Shield with the Arduino Sketch
and libraries loaded onto it. There are variances in the power metrics for the sketch,
mainly due to the LMIC library usage. These variances are due to the devices running on
a higher average current for slightly more extended periods, especially regarding OTAA.
When the devices are in the receive state, there is a higher “idle” current draw. This
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results in more energy consumed over a more extended period than the nodes that utilize
the stock firmware.

Table 11
LoRaWAN Shield with Arduino Sketch Average Power Data
Power Metric

Idle Performance

Average Tx Time (10 Round)

2.1207 s

Average Tx Current (10 Round)

21.8209 mA

Average Tx Consumed Energy (10 Round)

12.849 µAh

Average Tx Time (9 Round)

2.1149 s

Average Tx Current (9 Round)

21.4863 mA

Average Tx Consumed Energy (9 Round)

12.614 µAh

Average Tx Time (8 Round)

2.1129 s

Average Tx Current (8 Round)

21.1335 mA

Average Tx Consumed Energy (8 Round)

12.384 µAh

Average Tx Time (10 Round + MH)

2.1516 s

Average Tx Current (10 Round + MH)

22.1241 mA

Average Tx Consumed Energy (10 Round + MH)

13.217 µAh

Average Tx Time (9 Round + MH)

2.1494 s

Average Tx Current (9 Round + MH)

22.0443 mA

Average Tx Consumed Energy (9 Round + MH)

13.151 µAh
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Table 11 (continued)
Power Metric

Idle Performance

Average Tx Time (8 Round + MH)

2.1329 s

Average Tx Current (8 Round + MH)

21.9209 mA

Average Tx Consumed Energy (8 Round + MH)

12.990 µAh

Average OTAA Time

5.5423 s

Average OTAA Current

28.6813 mA

Average OTAA Consumed Energy

44.110 µAh

Figure 29. Average Time by Radio Transmission Type
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Figure 30. Average Current Draw by Radio Transmission Type
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Chapter 7
Analysis and Statistics

7.1 Equations
The parameters used to calculate battery life over time are shown in Table 12
below. The power data and battery consumption parameters are gathered from the
experiment section of this work using the power monitor. The result approximates the
estimated battery life for a node at a given average current consumption.

Table 12
Power Data and Battery Consumption Equation Parameters
Variable

Description

I

Interval of Data Transmission

ATotal

Total Time in Active mode

TxTotal

Total Time in Wake + Transmit mode

RxTotal

Total Time in Receive mode

STotal

Time in Sleep Duration

RxDelay1

Time in RxDelay1

RxDelay2

Time in RxDelay2

Rx1

Time in Rx1

Rx2

Time in Rx2
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Table 12 (continued)
Variable

Description

ACActive

Average Current during Active Mode

ACTx

Average Current during Tx

ACRx1

Average Current during Rx1

ACRx2

Average Current during Rx2

ACRx1Delay

Average Current during RxDelay1

ACRx2Delay

Average Current during RxDelay2

ACSleep

Average Current during Sleep Mode

RA

Ratio of Time in Active Mode

RS

Ratio of Time in Sleep Mode

BC

Battery Capacity in mAh

DC

Average Device Current in mA

BLHours

Estimated Battery Life in Hours, based on
ideal conditions

Variable

Description

I

Interval of Data Transmission

ATotal

Total Time in Active mode

Equation 1 below results in calculating the total amount of time the device is in
receive mode during a transmission. The variables match those required according to the
LoRaWAN Class A device transmission scheme. Equation 2 below results in calculating
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the total amount of time the device is in an active mode. The total time in the wake and
transmit mode and the result of Equation 1 (the total time in receive mode) are required.
Equation 3 below allows the calculation of the ratio of the total time a node is in active
mode between transmissions. The result requires the total amount of time throughout
transmissions. Equation 4 below allows the calculation of the ratio of time in sleep mode
between transmissions and requires the total amount of time the device is in sleep mode
divided by the interval of transmission.

RxTotal = RxDelay1 + Rx1 + RxDelay2 + Rx2

(1)

ATotal = TxTotal + RxTotal

(2)

RA = ATotal ÷ I

(3)

RS = STotal ÷ I

(4)

Equation 5 below results in calculating the average current during the active mode
of the device, particularly the wake and transmit, and receive states. This equation
requires the average current during wake and transmission, and the time the device takes
in that state. Next, the equation requires the average current during the receive delay state
and the time the state occurs. Next, the equation requires the average current during the
receiving state and the time the device is in that state. Next, the equation requires the
Second receive delay average current and the time it takes for that to occur. Next, the
second receive state average current and the time it takes to receive are required. Finally,
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this is all divided by the total time in active mode to get the entire activated state’s
average current draw.
Equation 6 below results in the calculation of the average current. The Average
Current requires the ratio of time the device is active and the average active current. The
average current calculation also involves the ratio of time the device is asleep, and the
average sleep current measured by the power monitor as a constant.

ACActive = ((ACTx × TxTotal ) + (ACRx1Delay × RxDelay1 ) + (ACRx1 × Rx1) +

(5)

(ACRx2Delay × RxDelay2) + (ACRx2 × Rx2)) ÷ ATotal

(5 cont.)

DC = ( RA × ACActive ) + ( RS × ACSleep )

(6)

Once the average current overtime is calculated, the total amount of hours the
device is estimated to be in operation can be calculated. The battery capacity in mAh is
required as well as the Average device consumption in mA. Equation 7 below is used to
estimate how long a battery will last. The estimate is based on the average current that a
load is drawing from it and the nominal battery capacity. Most battery capacity figures
are in milliamp-hours (mAh) or Amp-hours (Ah). Equation 7 below assumes a nominal
battery capacity is the total amount of energy that can be withdrawn from a battery at a
fully charged state at a particular current.
BLHours = BC ÷ DC
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(7)

Table 13 below contains the power data and battery life equation parameters. This
table outlines the parameters used for the average current for various modes of operation
and their time. Some parameters are used for the calculation of OTAA when it comes to
Join Scheduling.

Table 13
Power Data and Battery Life Equation Parameters
Variable

Description

ATotal

Total Time in Active mode

STotal

Time in Sleep Duration

I

Interval of Data Transmission in hours

JSrate

Interval of OTAA in hours

TTotal

Total Time per Period

TNo OTAA

Total time without OTAA

TOTAA

Total time in OTAA mode

ACActive

Average Current during Active Mode

CACOTAA

Average Current draw during OTAA

ACSleep

Average Current draw during Sleep Mode

ACTotal

Average Total current draw

TSleep

Total Seconds in Sleep mode before OTAA
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Table 13 (continued)
Variable

Description

RNormal

The ratio of Total Time under Normal Operation

ROTAA

The ratio of Total Time impacted by OTAA

ATotal

Total Time in Active mode

DCTotal

Average Total Device Current

DCNormal

Average Device Current during normal operation

DCOTAA

Average Device Current during OTAA

The purposes of the following equations are to calculate the effect OTAA has on a
schedule. To calculate the average current consumption of a device, the required
equations are provided below. Equation 8 calculates the total time interval between data
transmissions using the total time the device is active and the total time the device is in a
sleep state. Equation 9 calculates the total time in minutes per period. Equation 10
calculates the total time where the device does not have a period that contains OTAA.
Equation 11 calculates the ratio of time between the device not transmitting over the total
period. Equation 12 calculates the ratio of time impacted by OTAA by dividing the
interval by the total time per period. Equation 13 calculates the average current draw
during the period where OTAA occurs with sleep states, wake, and transmit states, and
OTAA states over the transmission interval. Equation 14 calculates the average device
current with the ratio of time impacted by OTAA. Equation 15 calculates the average
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device current during normal operation using the current during the normal operation and
the ratio of the time during normal operation. Equation 16 factors in both the normal time
and the time where OTAA occurs to get the average device current. This action factors in
the OTAA scheme and the rate of normal transmissions at specific intervals.
𝐼 = ATotal + STotal

(8)

TTotal = JSrate

(9)

TNo OTAA = TTotal – 𝐼

(10)

RNormal = TNo OTAA ÷ TTotal

(11)
(12)

ROTAA = I ÷ TTotal
ACOTAA = (( TSleep × ACSleep ) + ( TOTAA × ACOTAA ) + ( ATotal × DC )) ÷ 𝐼

(13)

DCOTAA = CACOTAA × ROTAA

(14)

DCNormal = ACActive × RNormal

(15)

DCTotal = DCOTAA + DCNormal

(16)

7.2 Battery Life with Round Reduction
Table 14 below contains the number of days the node will be operational when
implementing the proposed Round Reduction method, based on the battery life
calculations above. A lower sleep time means that the data is sent more frequently,
resulting in diminished battery life. Round Reduction adds a few days of battery life
when sleep time is low (data sent more regularly). Less data is sent, so more days are
saved when round reduction is utilized. Round Reduction has a lower impact when sleep
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times are over an hour. The idle current draw has a larger effect on battery life than
transmissions.

Table 14
LoRaWAN Shield with Sketch w/ Normal Transmissions & Reduced Rounds
Sleep Time

Days 10R

Days 9R

Days 8R

15 sec

43.74

44.48

45.20

30 sec

80.48

81.73

82.95

60 sec

138.75

140.61

142.41

300 sec

329.79

331.87

333.86

.25 hr

427.99

429.16

430.27

.5 hr

462.42

463.10

463.74

1 hr

481.80

482.16

482.51

12 hr

501.04

501.08

501.11

24 hr

501.95

501.97

501.99

7.3 Battery Life with Metadata Hiding
Table 15 below contains the number of days the node will be operational when
implementing the proposed Metadata Hiding method, based on the battery life
calculations above. Reduced Rounds combined with Metadata Hiding is also included in
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the data set, and as the rounds decrease, the battery life increases. Inherently, a lower
sleep time means that the data is sent more frequently, resulting in diminished battery
life. There is more overhead with round reduction, and the full impact can be seen
compared to other methods. Like Round Reduction, Metadata Hiding has a lower effect
when sleep times are over an hour. The idle current draw has a more considerable impact
than transmissions.

Table 15
LoRaWAN Shield with Sketch w/ Metadata Hiding & Reduced Rounds
Sleep Time

Days 10R

Days 9R

Days 8R

15 sec

42.61

42.80

43.32

30 sec

78.57

78.88

79.78

60 sec

135.91

136.38

137.71

300 sec

326.54

327.08

328.61

.25 hr

426.16

426.47

427.33

.5 hr

461.35

461.53

462.03

1 hr

481.21

481.31

481.59

12 hr

497.27

497.30

497.37

24 hr

500.99

501.00

501.02
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7.4 Battery Life with Join Scheduling
Table 16 below contains the number of days the node will be operational when
implementing the proposed Join Scheduling method, based on the battery life calculations
above. Reduced Rounds combined with Join Scheduling power data is also included in
the data set, and as the rounds decrease, the battery life increases. The rate at which the
OTAA operation is done in twenty-four hours. Like before, a lower sleep time means that
the data is sent more frequently, resulting in diminished battery life. There is more
overhead with OTAA. Like Round Reduction and Metadata Hiding, OTAA has a lower
effect when sleep times are over an hour.

Table 16
LoRaWAN Shield with Sketch w/ Join Scheduling & Reduced Rounds
Sleep Time

Days 10R + OTAA

Days 9R + OTAA

Days 8R + OTAA

15 sec

43.72

44.46

45.18

30 sec

80.42

81.67

82.89

60 sec

138.57

140.42

142.23

300 sec

328.76

330.84

332.85

.25 hr.

426.27

427.45

428.58

.5 hr.

460.40

461.11

461.78

1 hr.

479.61

480.01

480.39

12 hr.

498.68

498.75

498.81
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24 hr.

499.58

499.63

499.69

Table 17 below shows the increase of average current consumption when join
scheduling is considered. The values here can be used with the equations to calculate
battery life. More frequent usage of OTAA will reduce battery life. Less frequent usage
of OTAA will have a battery life comparable to the battery life of regular transmissions.

Table 17
Increase in Average Current Consumption with Join Scheduling
AES Rounds

24 Hours

12 Hours

6 Hours

1 Hour

10

0.001821

0.003642

0.007284

0.043709

9

0.001359

0.002719

0.005438

0.032632

8

0.001337

0.002675

0.005350

0.032101

7.5 Battery Life Cumulative Analysis
Table 18 below contains the number of days the node will be operational when
considering Round Reduction and Metadata Hiding combined with Round Reduction.
The results prove that eight rounds are the most efficient way to transfer packets to save
battery life. Using ten rounds is a safe bet, yet adding metadata hiding and reducing the
rounds to eight rounds has similar battery life. The most resource-intensive but most
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secure version is ten rounds and metadata hiding. Table 19 below contains the number of
days the node will be operational when considering Round Reduction and Join
Scheduling. Rounds Reduction saves battery life when using eight rounds with OTAA at
a 24-hour schedule compared to ten rounds with OTAA. OTAA adds some overhead, yet
it is worth it if metadata hiding is not used.
Table 18
Cumulative Analysis - Reduced Rounds vs. Metadata Hiding

60 sec

Days
8R
142.41

Days
9R
140.61

Days
10R
138.75

Days 8R
+ MH
137.71

Days 9R
+ MH
136.38

Days 10R
+ MH
135.91

30 min

463.74

463.10

462.42

462.03

461.53

461.35

1 hr.

482.51

482.16

481.80

481.59

481.31

481.21

12 hr.

501.11

501.08

501.04

497.37

497.30

497.27

24 hr.

501.99

501.97

501.95

501.02

501.00

500.99

Sleep Time

Table 19
Cumulative Analysis - Reduced Rounds vs. Join Scheduling
Sleep
Time
60 sec

Days
8R
142.41

Days 8R
+ OTAA
142.23

Days
9R
140.61

Days 9R
+ OTAA
140.42

Days
10R
138.75

Days 10R
+ OTAA
138.57

30 min

463.74

461.78

463.10

461.11

462.42

460.40

1 hr.

482.51

480.39

482.16

480.01

481.80

479.61

12 hr.

501.11

498.81

501.08

498.75

501.04

498.68
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24 hr.

501.99

499.69

501.97

499.63

501.95

501.95

Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work

8.1 Conclusion
The most considerable power-efficiency improvements come from using Round
Reduction when more frequent transmissions occur. As the data transmissions are spaced
out, the power draw is more affected by the sleep state power draw than the savings
during the less frequent transmissions. The most considerable security improvements are
met with Metadata hiding. Join Scheduling should be implemented to every node when a
network of devices is being provisioned.
This work introduces the concepts of Rounds Reduction, Join Scheduling, and
Metadata Hiding for LoRaWAN networks. The final results of the experiments are as
follows:
1. Use 8 Rounds & Join Scheduling if a concern is Metadata Collection and
long-term power expenditure.
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2. Use 8 Rounds & Metadata Hiding if you care about Metadata Collection
and want to keep battery life close to that of a standard transmission with
ten rounds.
3. Use 10 Rounds & Metadata Hiding if you care about Metadata
Collection and do not care about the battery life lost with the
computational overhead.

In Figure XX below, the flowchart details what decisions to make when
considering the methods proposed.

Figure 31. LoRaWAN Configuration Flow Chart
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Though LoRaWAN is secure by design, many various vulnerabilities are inherent
to the design. Some vulnerabilities are difficult to solve, such as the physical security of
the keys. Some vulnerabilities can be mitigated with features inherent to the LoRaWAN
protocol, such as OTAA or public fields. Modification to the source code of LoRaWAN
and the ability to test real-world sensor nodes is critical to quantify the security vs.
battery life of LoRaWAN nodes.

8.2 Future Work
The use of a cryptographic coprocessor, as described in Chapter 3, would add
much needed physical security to the end nodes. An external cryptographic coprocessor
would require pre-installed keys, and the data would need to be encrypted on the
coprocessor and the generation of the message integrity code. Though it is easier to test
with existing hardware by using an external cryptographic coprocessor, there is an
inherent sleep state power draw when using the external cryptographic coprocessor.
Additionally, there are many different modifications needed to the LMIC source code to
ensure the encryption can occur on the external cryptographic coprocessor rather than the
node itself.
Testing the optimization methods on Class B or Class C devices, mentioned in
Chapter 2, is a useful endeavor. This idea will extend the security and power benefits to
more resource-intensive device classes. There may be more considerable benefits of the
schemes when using Class B and Class C devices.
Future-proofing LoRaWAN and discovering the overhead involved when
switching from AES-128 to AES-192 or AES-256 is a useful concept. Eventually, AES88

128 will be deprecated and no longer safe to use; it will help replace the current
encryption scheme and implement it into the LoRaWAN standard.
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